Research

My primary research lies at the intersection of traditional and formal epistemology. Broadly speaking, I am interested in the relationship between traditional and formal epistemology: ways the two subdisciplines come apart, but also their overlap and common themes. Much of my research is focused on the relationship between each subdiscipline’s doxastic building blocks, belief and credence. Making progress on the relationship between belief and credence is one way to bring together the two branches of epistemology and see their relationship more clearly. Within this framework, I also explore questions about the nature of evidence, e.g. can evidence be permissive? To what extent can evidence move around our credences without changing what we ought to believe? I have further interest in in the relationship between practical and epistemic rationality, e.g. what are the bounds of epistemic rationality? Can practical and/or moral stakes affect epistemic justification?

I apply this work in epistemology to philosophy of religion, specifically to the epistemic and practical rationality of faith and religious commitment. This includes questions about whether faith can be rational but nonetheless go beyond the evidence, and, in general, what might underlie the diachronic rationality of long-term commitments. Finally, I’m interested in Pascal’s Wager, and the implications it has for both decision theory and the practical rationality of theistic commitment.

Below are abstracts of my published articles with links to the full papers. If you don’t have access to the official version, all published papers are available for free download via the PhilPapers link.

Journal Articles

(16) Epistemic Akrasia and Belief-Credence Dualism (with Peter Tan). Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Official Version

(15) The Ethics of Religious Belief. Forthcoming in Religious Studies Archives.

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(14) Settling the Unsettled: Roles for Belief. Forthcoming in Analysis. (Critical Notice on Julia Staffel’s Unsettled Thoughts.)

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  • Official Version

(13) Why Credences Are Not Beliefs. Forthcoming in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

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  • Official Version

(12) Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment (with Jamie Fritz). Forthcoming in Synthese.

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  • Official Version

(11) Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment. (2021). Mind. 130(517): 35–57.

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  • Official Version
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Brain in a Vat (video link) (podcast link), and on Staseōs (video link).

(10) A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism. (2021). Episteme18(2): 313–327.

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(9) Children, Fetuses, and the Non-Existent: Moral Obligations and the Beginning of Life. (2021). The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 46(4): 379–393.

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  • Official Version

(8) Credence: A Belief-First Approach (with Andrew Moon). (2020). The Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 50(5): 652–669.

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  • Official Version

(7) The Relationship Between Belief and Credence. (2020). Philosophy Compass. 15(6): 1–13.

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  • Official Version
  • I made a 6-minute video abstract of this paper (video link).
  • Download the teaching and learning guide for this article (Philpapers).

(6) Belief, Credence, and Evidence. (2020). Synthese197(11): 5073–5092.

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  • Official Version

(5) Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters. (2019). Philosophical Studies. 176(9): 2477–2496.

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  • Official Version

(4) How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment. (2019). The Philosophical Quarterly. 69(276): 511–533.

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  • Official version

(3) Belief, Credence, and Faith. (2019). Religious Studies. 55(2): 153–168.

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  • Official Version
  • Winner of the Religious Studies Post Graduate Essay Prize.
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Believing Thinkers (video link), and a short, popular-level summary of this paper was published on “The Open Table” (blog link).

(2) Salvaging Pascal’s Wager (with Andy Rogers). (2019). Philosophia Christi. 21(1): 59–84.

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  • Official Version
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Crash Course Apologetics (video link) and on the Classical Theism Podcast (podcast link).

(1) Wagering Against Divine Hiddenness. (2016). The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 8(4): 85–105.

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  • Official version
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Crash Course Apologetics (video link) and on The Ultimist Podcast (podcast link).

Textbook

Applied Ethics: An Impartial Introduction (with Tyron Goldschmidt, Rebecca Chan, and Dustin Crummett). (2021). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.

  • PhilPapers Link

Book Chapters

(8) Pragmatic Arguments for Theism. In The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology (John Greco, Tyler McNabb, and Jonathan Fuqua, eds.). Under contract with Cambridge University Press.

(7) Faith and Reason. In The Handbook of Philosophy of Religion (Mark A. Lamport, ed.). Under contract with Rowman and Littlefield.

  • Download on Philpapers
  • We cover some of the content from this paper in this Q&A on Faith and Reason, hosted by Capturing Christianity (video link).
  • For a translation of this article into Persian, see here (PDF link).

(6) Faith, Hope, and Justification. In Propositional and Doxastic Justification (Luis R.G. Oliveira and Paul Silva, eds.). Routledge Studies in Epistemology. Under contract with Routledge.

  • Download on Philpapers
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Proslogion Philosophy (video link).

(5) Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence (with Margaret Turnbull). In The Routledge Handbook of Evidence (Clayton Littlejohn and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio eds.). Under contract with Routledge.

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(4) Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism. In Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, and Matthias Steup, eds.). Under contract with Routledge.

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  • I presented this paper at the Social (Distance) Epistemology workshop (video link), was interviewed about this paper by Spartan Theology (video link), and presented this paper at the University of Cologne (podcast link).

(3) What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism? (2022). Epistemic Autonomy (Kirk Lougheed and Jonathan Matheson, eds.), pp. 132–150. Routledge Studies in Epistemology. New York: Routledge.

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  • Official Version (Routledge)
  • Official Version (Amazon)

(2) Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology. (2020). Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications (Amiel Bernal and Guy Axtell, eds.), pp. 201–215. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

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  • Official Version (Rowman and Littlefield)
  • Official Version (Amazon)

(1) The Nature and Rationality of Faith. (2020). The New Theists (Joshua Rasmussen and Kevin Vallier, eds.), pp. 77–92. New York: Routledge.

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Official Version (Routledge)
  • Official Version (Amazon)
  • I was interviewed about the paper on Capturing Christianity (video link), on Finding Truth (video link) and a short, popular-level summary of this paper was published on “The Open Table” (blog link).

Other Publications

Epistemology. (Forthcoming). In The T&T Clark Encyclopedia of Christian Theology (Paul Allen, ed.). New York: T&T Clark/Bloomsbury.

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Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God. (2021). In 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.

  • Link to Article
  • Link to Article in PDF form
  • Link to Article in Turkish

Review of Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement, by Guy Axtell. (2019). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 

A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism. (2018). In The Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Brazilian Society of Analytic Philosophy (João Luis Pereira Ourique, ed.), pp. 77–78. Pelotas, Brazil: Série Dissertatio de Filosofia.

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Dissertation

Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism. (2019). University of Notre Dame. Notre Dame, IN: ProQuest.

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Below are abstracts of some of my unpublished current projects. The titles of papers under review are redacted. If you’re interested, feel free to email me for a draft!

Under Review

A paper on epistemology and Pascal’s wager

A paper defending an alternative version of Pascal’s wager

A paper on divine mental states (with Justin Mooney)

A paper on epistemology, theism, and value

Works in Progress

Must Beliefs and Evidence Agree? A Debate (with Scott Stapleford). Under contract with Routledge, for the Little Debates about Big Questions series (Tyron Goldschmidt and Dustin Crummett, series editors).

Faithfully Taking Pascal’s Wager, for a special issue of The Monist on faith, hope, and trust (Finlay Malcolm, ed.). Forthcoming in 2023.

  • Presented at the Pacific APA (March 2021, via Zoom) (Handout) (Video)
  • Download on PhilPapers
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Proslogion Philosophy (video link)

On the Independence of Belief and Credence, for Philosophical Issues, Issue 32 (topic: epistemology). Forthcoming in 2022.

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Presented at Australian National University, Philosophy Department Seminar (October 2019)
  • Presented at the Ninth Workshop on Combining Probability and Logic, Frankfurt, Germany (July 2019)
  • Presented at the St. Louis Conference on Reasons and Rationality (May 2019)
  • Presented at the Belief in Context Workshop, University of Hamburg, Germany (February 2019)

How Low Can You Go? Belief, Credence, and Philosophical Views 

  • Handout
  • Presented at the Eastern APA (January 2021, online) (Handout) (Video)
  • To be presented at the Midwest Epistemology Workshop, University of Iowa (October 2021)
  • To be presented at New Mexico State University (December 2021)

Interpersonal Faith and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs

  • Presented at the Pepperdine Colloquium series (September 2020, online) (Slides)
  • To be presented at the Inaugural Princeton Project in Philosophy and Religion Conference (October 2021)

Explaining Evil and Pragmatic Belief

  • To be presented at the Capturing Christianity Conference (August 2021)

The Axiology of Theism and the Rationality of Faith

  • Presented at the Tyndale Philosophy of Religion Conference (June 2021, online) (Handout)

Faith, Belief, and Religious Experience

  • Presented at Valparaiso University (October 2019)

Credal Functionalism (with Justin D’Ambrosio)

  • To be presented at the University of Leeds (TBD)

Permissivism, Encroachment, and Practical Reasons for Belief

  • Presented at “Encroachment at Home” (May 2020, online)