My primary research lies at the intersection of traditional and formal epistemology. Broadly speaking, I am interested in the relationship between traditional and formal epistemology: ways the two subdisciplines come apart, but also their overlap and common themes. Much of my research is focused on the relationship between each subdiscipline’s doxastic building blocks, belief and credence. Making progress on the relationship between belief and credence is one way to bring together the two branches of epistemology and see their relationship more clearly. Within this framework, I also explore questions about the nature of evidence, e.g. can evidence be permissive? Can evidence move around our credences without changing what we ought to believe? I have further interest in in the relationship between practical and epistemic rationality, e.g. what are the bounds of epistemic rationality? Can practical and/or moral stakes affect epistemic justification? 

I apply this work in epistemology to philosophy of religion, specifically to the epistemic and practical rationality of faith and religious commitment. This includes questions about whether faith can be rational but nonetheless go beyond the evidence, and, in general, what might underlie the diachronic rationality of long-term commitments. Finally, I’m interested in Pascal’s Wager, and the implications it has for both decision theory and the practical rationality of theistic commitment. 

Below are abstracts of my published articles with links to the full papers. If you don’t have access to the official version, all published papers are available for free download via the PhilPapers link. 

Journal Articles

A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism. Forthcoming in Episteme

  • Philpapers Link

How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment. Forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly. 

  • PhilPapers Link
  • Official version

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters. Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.

  • PhilPapers Link
  • Official Version

Belief, Credence, and Evidence. Forthcoming in Synthese.

  • PhilPapers Link
  • Official Version

Salvaging Pascal’s Wager (with Andy Rogers). Forthcoming in Philosophia Christi

  • PhilPapers Link

Belief, Credence, and Faith. (2019). Religious Studies 55(2): 153-168.

  • PhilPapers Link
  • Official Version
  • Winner of the Religious Studies Post Graduate Essay Prize.
  • A short, popular-level summary of this paper was published on a blog called “The Open Table.”

Wagering Against Divine Hiddenness. (2016). The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8(4): 85-105.

  • PhilPapers link
  • Official version
  • Link to my discussion of this paper on “The Ultimist” podcast.

Contributions to Edited Volumes

Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence (with Margaret Turnbull). Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence (Clayton Littlejohn and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio eds.). New York: Routledge.

  • PhilPapers Link

The Nature and Rationality of Faith. Forthcoming in The New Theists (Joshua Rasmussen and Kevin Vallier, eds.). New York: Routledge.

  • PhilPapers Link
  • A short, popular-level summary of this paper was published on a blog called “The Open Table.”

A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism. (2018). The Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Brazilian Society of Analytic Philosophy (João Luis Pereira Ourique, ed.), pp. 77-78. Pelotas, Brazil: Série Dissertatio de Filosofia.

  • PhilPapers Link


Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism. (2019). University of Notre Dame. Notre Dame, IN: ProQuest.

  • Download on Philpapers

Below are abstracts of some of my unpublished current projects. The titles of papers under review are redacted. If you’re interested, feel free to email me for a draft!

Under Review

A paper on the diachronic rationality of commitment

A paper on belief and credence (with Andrew Moon

A paper on moral encroachment (with Jamie Fritz)

Full Drafts Available

Belief, Credence, and Graspability: Why Credences are not Beliefs

Epistemic Akrasia and Belief-Credence Dualism (with Peter Tan)

On the Independence of Belief and Credence 

In Progress

Epistemic Permissivism and Pascal’s Wager

Faith, Hope, and Justification

Some Considerations Against Epistemic Paternalism