My primary research lies at the intersection of traditional and formal epistemology. Broadly speaking, I am interested in the relationship between traditional and formal epistemology: ways the two subdisciplines come apart, but also their overlap and common themes. Much of my research is focused on the relationship between each subdiscipline’s doxastic building blocks, belief and credence. Making progress on the relationship between belief and credence is one way to bring together the two branches of epistemology and see their relationship more clearly. Within this framework, I also explore questions about the nature of evidence, e.g. can evidence be permissive? Can evidence move around our credences without changing what we ought to believe? I have further interest in in the relationship between practical and epistemic rationality, e.g. what are the bounds of epistemic rationality? Can practical and/or moral stakes affect epistemic justification? 

I apply this work in epistemology to philosophy of religion, specifically to the epistemic and practical rationality of faith and religious commitment. This includes questions about whether faith can be rational but nonetheless go beyond the evidence, and, in general, what might underlie the diachronic rationality of long-term commitments. Finally, I’m interested in Pascal’s Wager, and the implications it has for both decision theory and the practical rationality of theistic commitment. 

Below are abstracts of my published articles with links to the full papers. If you don’t have access to the official version, all published papers are available for free download via the PhilPapers link. 

Journal Articles

(8) Credence: A Belief-First Approach (with Andrew Moon). Forthcoming in The Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

(7) A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism. Forthcoming in Episteme

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  • Official Version

(6) Belief, Credence, and Evidence. Forthcoming in Synthese.

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  • Official Version

(5) Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters. (2019). Philosophical Studies. 176(9): 2477-2496.

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  • Official Version

(4) How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment. (2019). The Philosophical Quarterly. 69(276): 511-533.

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  • Official version

(3) Belief, Credence, and Faith. (2019). Religious Studies. 55(2): 153-168.

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  • Official Version
  • Winner of the Religious Studies Post Graduate Essay Prize.
  • A short, popular-level summary of this paper was published on a blog called “The Open Table.”

(2) Salvaging Pascal’s Wager (with Andy Rogers). (2019). Philosophia Christi. 21(1): 59-84.

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  • Official Version

(1) Wagering Against Divine Hiddenness. (2016). The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 8(4): 85-105.

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  • Official version
  • Link to my discussion of this paper on “The Ultimist” podcast.

Contributions to Edited Volumes

(6) Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence (with Margaret Turnbull). Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence (Clayton Littlejohn and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio eds.). New York: Routledge.

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(5) Faith, Hope, and Justification. Forthcoming in Propositional and Doxastic Justification (Luis R.G. Oliveira and Paul Silva, eds.). Routledge Studies in Epistemology. New York: Routledge.

(4) What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism? Forthcoming in Essays in Epistemic Autonomy  (Kirk Lougheed and Jonathan Matheson, eds.). Routledge Studies in Epistemology. New York: Routledge.

(3) Faith and Reason. (2022). In the Handbook of Philosophy of Religion (Mark A. Lamport, ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

(2) Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology. (2020). Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications (Amiel Bernal and Guy Axtell, eds.). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

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(1) The Nature and Rationality of Faith. (2020). The New Theists (Joshua Rasmussen and Kevin Vallier, eds.), pp. 77-92. New York: Routledge.

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  • Official Version (Routledge)
  • Official Version (Amazon)
  • A short, popular-level summary of this paper was published on a blog called “The Open Table.”

Other Publications

Epistemology. (2021). In The T&T Clark Encyclopedia of Christian Theology (Paul Allen, ed.). New York: T&T Clark/Bloomsbury.

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Review of Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement, by Guy Axtell. (2019). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 

A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism. (2018). In The Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Brazilian Society of Analytic Philosophy (João Luis Pereira Ourique, ed.), pp. 77-78. Pelotas, Brazil: Série Dissertatio de Filosofia.

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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism. (2019). University of Notre Dame. Notre Dame, IN: ProQuest.

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Below are abstracts of some of my unpublished current projects. The titles of papers under review are redacted. If you’re interested, feel free to email me for a draft!

Books (under contract)

(2) Must Beliefs and Evidence Agree? A Debate (with Scott Stapleford). Under contract with Routledge, for the Little Debates about Big Questions series (Tyron Goldschmidt, series editor). 

(1) Applied Ethics: An Impartial Introduction (with Tyron Goldschmidt, Beth Seacord, and Rebecca Chan). Under contract with Hackett Publishing. 

Under Review

A paper on the diachronic rationality of commitment

A paper on belief and credence

A paper on moral encroachment (with Jamie Fritz)

A paper defending belief-credence dualism (with Peter Tan)

Works in Progress

Belief, Credence, and Graspability: Why Credences Are Not Beliefs

  • Presented at Australian Catholic University (Nov 2019)
  • To be presented at the Central APA (Feb 2020)

Epistemic Permissivism and Pascal’s Wager

  • Presented at the Canadian Philosophical Association (June 2019)

Credal Functionalism (with Justin D’Ambrosio)

  • To be presented at the University of Leeds (March 2020)

The Faith of the Wagerer

  • Presented at Valparaiso University (October 2019)

An Epistemic Version of Pascal’s Wager

  • Presented at Ryerson University (Dec 2019)
  • To be presented at the Canadian Philosophical Association (June 2020)

Belief, Credence, and Philosophy 

  • To be presented at New Mexico State University (March 2021)

Permissivism, Encroachment, and Practical Reasons for Belief

Interpersonal Faith and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs

The Relationship Between Belief and Credence (for Philosophy Compass)