Research

My primary research lies at the intersection of traditional and formal epistemology. Broadly speaking, I am interested in the relationship between traditional and formal epistemology: ways the two subdisciplines come apart, but also their overlap and common themes. Much of my research is focused on the relationship between each subdiscipline’s doxastic building blocks, belief and credence. Making progress on the relationship between belief and credence is one way to bring together the two branches of epistemology and see their relationship more clearly. Within this framework, I also explore questions about the nature of evidence, e.g. can evidence be permissive? To what extent can evidence move around our credences without changing what we ought to believe? I have further interest in in the relationship between practical and epistemic rationality, e.g. what are the bounds of epistemic rationality? Can practical and/or moral stakes affect epistemic justification? 

I apply this work in epistemology to philosophy of religion, specifically to the epistemic and practical rationality of faith and religious commitment. This includes questions about whether faith can be rational but nonetheless go beyond the evidence, and, in general, what might underlie the diachronic rationality of long-term commitments. Finally, I’m interested in Pascal’s Wager, and the implications it has for both decision theory and the practical rationality of theistic commitment. 

Below are abstracts of my published articles with links to the full papers. If you don’t have access to the official version, all published papers are available for free download via the PhilPapers link. 

Journal Articles

(11) Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment (with Jamie Fritz). Forthcoming in Synthese.

  • Download on Philpapers

(10) Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment. Forthcoming in Mind.

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Official Version
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Brain in a Vat (video link) (podcast link). 

(9) A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism. Forthcoming in Episteme

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Official Version

(8) Belief, Credence, and Evidence. Forthcoming in Synthese.

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  • Official Version

(7) Credence: A Belief-First Approach (with Andrew Moon). (2020). The Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 50(5): 652–669.

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Official Version

(6) The Relationship Between Belief and Credence. (2020). Philosophy Compass. 15(6): 1–13.

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Official Version
  • I made a 6-minute video abstract of this paper (video link).
  • Download the teaching and learning guide for this article (Philpapers).

(5) Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters. (2019). Philosophical Studies. 176(9): 2477–2496.

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  • Official Version

(4) How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment. (2019). The Philosophical Quarterly. 69(276): 511–533.

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  • Official version

(3) Belief, Credence, and Faith. (2019). Religious Studies. 55(2): 153–168.

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  • Official Version
  • Winner of the Religious Studies Post Graduate Essay Prize.
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Believing Thinkers (video link), and a short, popular-level summary of this paper was published on “The Open Table” (blog link). 

(2) Salvaging Pascal’s Wager (with Andy Rogers). (2019). Philosophia Christi. 21(1): 59–84.

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Official Version
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Crash Course Apologetics (video link) and on the Classical Theism Podcast (podcast link).

(1) Wagering Against Divine Hiddenness. (2016). The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 8(4): 85–105.

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Official version
  • I was interviewed about this paper on Crash Course Apologetics (video link) and on The Ultimist Podcast (podcast link).

Contributions to Edited Volumes

(7) Faith and Reason. In The Handbook of Philosophy of Religion (Mark A. Lamport, ed.). Under contract with Rowman and Littlefield.

(6) Pragmatic Arguments for Theism. In The Cambridge Companion to Religious Epistemology (Tyler McNabb and Jonathan Fuqua, eds.). Under contract with Cambridge University Press. 

(5) Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence (with Margaret Turnbull). In The Routledge Handbook of Evidence (Clayton Littlejohn and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio eds.). Under contract with Routledge.

  • Download on PhilPapers

(4) Faith, Hope, and Justification. In Propositional and Doxastic Justification (Luis R.G. Oliveira and Paul Silva, eds.). Routledge Studies in Epistemology. Under contract with Routledge.

(3) What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism? In Essays in Epistemic Autonomy  (Kirk Lougheed and Jonathan Matheson, eds.). Routledge Studies in Epistemology. Under contract with Routledge.

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(2) Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology. (2020). Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications (Amiel Bernal and Guy Axtell, eds.), pp. 201–215. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

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  • Official Version (Rowman and Littlefield)

(1) The Nature and Rationality of Faith. (2020). The New Theists (Joshua Rasmussen and Kevin Vallier, eds.), pp. 77–92. New York: Routledge.

  • Download on PhilPapers
  • Official Version (Routledge)
  • Official Version (Amazon)
  • I was interviewed about the paper on Capturing Christianity (video link), on Finding Truth (video link) and a short, popular-level summary of this paper was published on “The Open Table” (blog link).

Other Publications

Epistemology. (2021). In The T&T Clark Encyclopedia of Christian Theology (Paul Allen, ed.). New York: T&T Clark/Bloomsbury.

  • Download on PhilPapers

Review of Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement, by Guy Axtell. (2019). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 

A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism. (2018). In The Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Brazilian Society of Analytic Philosophy (João Luis Pereira Ourique, ed.), pp. 77–78. Pelotas, Brazil: Série Dissertatio de Filosofia.

  • Download on PhilPapers

Dissertation

Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism. (2019). University of Notre Dame. Notre Dame, IN: ProQuest.

  • Download on Philpapers

Below are abstracts of some of my unpublished current projects. The titles of papers under review are redacted. If you’re interested, feel free to email me for a draft!

Books (under contract)

(2) Must Beliefs and Evidence Agree? A Debate (with Scott Stapleford). Under contract with Routledge, for the Little Debates about Big Questions series (Tyron Goldschmidt, series editor). 

(1) Applied Ethics: An Impartial Introduction (with Tyron Goldschmidt, Rebecca Chan, and Dustin Crummett). Under contract with Hackett Publishing. 

Under Review

A paper on belief and credence

A paper defending belief-credence dualism (with Peter Tan)

A paper arguing against views that reduce credence to belief

A paper on epistemology and Pascal’s wager

A paper defending an alternative version of Pascal’s wager

Works in Progress 

Faith, Hope, and Pascal’s Wager, for a special issue of The Monist on faith, hope, and trust (Finlay Malcolm, ed.)

  • Presented at Valparaiso University (October 2019)

Faith, Belief, and Religious Experience, for an edited volume on religious experience (Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, ed.)

Credal Functionalism (with Justin D’Ambrosio)

  • To be presented at the University of Leeds (Date TBD)

Belief, Credence, and Philosophy 

  • To be presented at New Mexico State University (March 2021)

Permissivism, Encroachment, and Practical Reasons for Belief

  • Presented at “Encroachment at Home” (May 2020, via Zoom)

Interpersonal Faith and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs

  • To be presented at the Inaugural Princeton Project in Philosophy and Religion Conference (October 2021)