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Additional Readings

Disagreement:
  - Collection of a bunch of essays on disagreement.
  - Longer defense of conciliationism against worries from permissivism, skepticism, etc.
  - If the order in which evidence is acquired should not influence what we believe, then (traditional versions of) conciliationism are false.
  - In a credal framework, it’s hard to know what even exactly counts as agreement/disagreement. This paper explores ways we might understand (dis)agreement in a credal framework.

Permissivism/Uniqueness:
  - White’s paper rehashes some of the arguments in the original 2004 paper, but he adds some new arguments too. Kelly provides some interesting arguments in favor of permissivism.
  - Distinguishes between types of permissivism; addresses ways that indifference principles seem to create problems for permissive Bayesianism.
  - Interesting argument against credal permissivism.
  - Provides arguments for uniqueness that have to do with the roles of rational evaluations.
  - Uniqueness is the best explanation for promoting the value of rationality.
  - Argues that permissivists can better capture the connection between rationality and accuracy than those who endorse uniqueness.
  - I discuss why the belief-credence relationship has important implications for both the permissivism debate and the disagreement debate.