

Foundations: Disagreement and Permissivism

Liz Jackson, Fall 2020

Tuesdays at 11am, Benjamin Library

Date	Topic	Required Reading	Recommended Reading
10 March 2020	Disagreement: <i>Steadfastness and Conciliationism</i>	Christensen, David. (2009). "Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy." <i>Philosophy Compass</i> 4/5: 756–757.	Kelly, Thomas. (2005). "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement." <i>Oxford Studies in Epistemology</i> (vol. 1), pp. 167–197. Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne, eds. Oxford: OUP.
17 March 2020	Disagreement: <i>Peerhood</i>	King, Nathan. (2012). "A Good Peer is Hard to Find." <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> 85(2): 249–272.	Easwaran et al. (2016). "Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy." <i>Philosophers' Imprint</i> 16(11): 1–39.
23 March 2020 <u>(NOTE THIS IS A MONDAY)</u>	Disagreement: <i>A third view?</i>	Lackey, Jennifer. (2008). "A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance." In <i>Social Epistemology</i> , pp. 145–154. Alan Millar Adrian Haddock & Duncan Pritchard, eds. Oxford: OUP.	Buchak, Lara. (Forthcoming). "A Faithful Response to Disagreement." <i>The Philosophical Review</i> .
Three-week break			
21 April 2020	Permissivism/ Uniqueness: <i>For and Against</i>	Kopec, Matthew and Michael Titelbaum. (2016). "The Uniqueness Thesis." <i>Philosophy Compass</i> 11/4: 189–200.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • White, Roger. (2005). "Epistemic Permissiveness." <i>Philosophical Perspectives</i> 19: 445–59. • Schoenfield, Miriam. (2014). "Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief." <i>Noûs</i> 48: 193–218.
28 April 2020	Permissivism/ Uniqueness: <i>Relationship to Disagreement</i>	Christensen, David. (2016). "Conciliationism, Uniqueness, and Rationality Toxicity." <i>Noûs</i> 50(3): 584–603.	Levinstein, Benjamin. (2017). "Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity." <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> 94(2): 342-370.
5 May 2020	Permissivism/ Uniqueness: <i>Intrapersonal Permissivism</i>	Roeber, Blake. (Forthcoming). "Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control." <i>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</i> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Callahan, Laura. (Forthcoming). "Epistemic Existentialism." <i>Episteme</i>. • Jackson, Elizabeth. (Forthcoming). "A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism." <i>Episteme</i>.

Additional Readings

Disagreement:

- *The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays*. (2013). David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, eds. Oxford: OUP. [Link](#).
 - Collection of a bunch of essays on disagreement.
- John Pittard. (2019). *Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment*. Oxford: OUP. [Link](#).
- Christensen, David. (2007). “The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.” *The Philosophical Review* 116(2): 187-217.
 - Longer defense of conciliationism against worries from permissivism, skepticism, etc.
- Gardiner, Georgi. (2014). “The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement.” *Episteme* 11(1): 83-95.
 - If the order in which evidence is acquired should not influence what we believe, then (traditional versions of) conciliationism are false.
- Rowbottom, Darrel. (2018). “What is (Dis)agreement?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 97(1): 223–236.
 - In a credal framework, it’s hard to know what even exactly counts as agreement/disagreement. This paper explores ways we might understand (dis)agreement in a credal framework.
 - Also relevant: Palmira, Michele. (2017). “Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief.” *Ratio* 31(2): 179–196.

Permissivism/Uniqueness:

- Kelly, Thomas. “Evidence can be Permissive.” AND White, Roger “Evidence cannot be Permissive.” (2013). *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*. Steup, Turri, & Sosa, eds. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
 - White’s paper rehashes some of the arguments in the original 2004 paper, but he adds some new arguments too. Kelly provides some interesting arguments in favor of permissivism.
- Meacham, Christopher. (2014). “Impermissible Bayesianism.” *Erkenntnis* 79: 1185–217.
 - Distinguishes between types of permissivism; addresses ways that indifference principles seem to create problems for permissive Bayesianism.
- Schultheis, Ginger. (2018). “Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.” *Mind* 127(507): 863-879.
 - Interesting argument against credal permissivism.
- Greco, Daniel and Brian Hedden. (2016). “Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.” *The Journal of Philosophy* 113(8): 365-395.
 - Provides arguments for uniqueness that have to do with the roles of rational evaluations.
- Dogramaci, Sinan and Sophie Horowitz. (2016). “An Argument for Uniqueness about Evidential Support.” *Philosophical Issues* 26: 130-147.
 - Uniqueness is the best explanation for promoting the value of rationality.
- Schoenfield, Miriam. (2019). “Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 99(2): 286-297.
 - Argues that permissivists can better capture the connection between rationality and accuracy than those who endorse uniqueness.
- Jackson, Elizabeth. (2019). “Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.” *Philosophical Studies*
 - I discuss why the belief-credence relationship has important implications for both the permissivism debate and the disagreement debate.